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As ever Larkin look like Eric Morecambe with depression.
Just that morning, the ticket woman told me, she'd been berated for allowing a homage to a racist poet to be installed in the very house where the end of slavery was made possible. And, if she'd looked at the other displays, she'd have seen slavery hasn't ended at all.
The grand jury indicted Hull on one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U. The court said it was “comfortable” that the forfeiture was not a grossly disproportionate penalty in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause, because Hull's equity in the property did not exceed the maximum applicable fine. It also provided a secure place to store the images that he later distributed. Hull purchased the acreage in one land contract, and it is described in county records as one unit of property. Because there is no such language in § 2253(a)(3)-the statute simply directs forfeiture of “any property” used to commit the offense-Hull contends that the statute allows the court to determine whether only a portion of the acreage should be forfeited. § 1955(d), which allows forfeiture of “[a]ny property” that is “used” in a gambling operation.
Use of a computer in the privacy of the residence, rather than in a library, coffee shop, or senior center, made it easier for Hull to conceal his crimes from public scrutiny. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1308-09 (11th Cir.1999). Because Hull's acreage is a single tract of land that was conveyed to him as a whole, the district court was correct to treat the entire acreage as a single piece of “property” when applying the statute. We disagree that the text of § 2253(a)(3) allows for subdivision of the property. The “property” at issue there consisted of a two-story building and a parking lot.
The statute calls for forfeiture of “property” used to commit the offense, but does not further address what constitutes one piece of forfeitable “property.” Hull suggests that the court should consider the “residence” separately from “outbuildings” or “farm and pasture land,” and require a showing of “use” and “substantial connection” with respect to each portion before it is forfeitable. In addition to the textual difficulties with Hull's apportionment argument, we see no meaningful basis on which to distinguish 318 South Third Street. Sherman, 262 F.3d 784, 795 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting 817 N. The relatively high recommended fine range does not suggest a minimal level of culpability, and a comparison of the forfeiture and the fine range suggests that the forfeiture is, at a minimum, presumptively not excessive.
The Assistant United States Attorney advised the district court that this case is the first in which the government sought forfeiture of a home and other real property in Southern Iowa based on a defendant's use of a computer within the home to commit a child pornography offense. There is no requirement of “strict proportionality”; a forfeiture passes constitutional muster unless it is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense.” Id. Although the fines authorized by statute and the sentencing guidelines cannot override the constitutional rule, id. 14, they are relevant evidence on the question of proportionality. Nor can it be said that the harm caused by Hull's conduct was minimal. Ownby, 131 F.3d 138 (4th Cir.1997) (unpublished table decision).4.
The objects included his bike, long johns, geeky glasses, some jazz records and several photos.
He discussed the possibility of the group meeting in Florida or Iowa. Hull's first contention is that the district court erred by ordering forfeiture without proof that he used or intended to use the real property to commit or promote the commission of his offenses, as required for forfeiture under 18 U. Section 2253(a)(3), a criminal forfeiture statute, states that a person convicted of a child pornography offense under § 2252 “shall forfeit to the United States such person's interest in any property, real or personal, used or intended to be used to commit or to promote the commission of such offense or any property traceable to such property.” Although § 2253(a)(3) does not state the standard of proof required for forfeiture, the parties agree that the district court correctly adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard that is used for other criminal forfeiture determinations. Myers, 21 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. The context in which “used” appears in § 2253(a)(3) suggests no different meaning.
Hull also had online conversations with officers in Missouri and North Carolina who posed as mothers of young females. Bieri (Bieri I), 21 F.3d 819, 821-22 (8th Cir.1994). We think it clear that Hull “used” his real property “to commit” or “to promote the commission of” the child pornography offenses.
Hull posits that he could just as easily have used a motel room, but use of the residence avoided rental costs and the attention that would be attracted by frequent visits to local motels. Our cases have concluded, with respect to other criminal forfeiture statutes, 21 U. Hull suggests that even if the acreage is one piece of “property,” the statute still permits the court to subdivide that property when ordering forfeiture. Once it is established that the “property” subject to forfeiture consists of the entire acreage, nothing in the statute allows the court to order forfeiture of less than this “property.” Although Bieri I discussed the “in any manner or part” language of § 853(a)(2), this language in the drug forfeiture statute does not speak to whether forfeitable property may be subdivided. Thus, the absence of the “in any manner or part” language in § 2253(a)(3) does not materially distinguish this case from Bieri I on the question whether only a portion of the property should be forfeited. 318 South Third Street, 988 F.2d 822 (8th Cir.1993), is even closer on point, and it weighs strongly against Hull's position. The defendant urged that because gambling occurred only on the second floor, the forfeiture of “property” should have been limited to that portion of the building. In this case, to support its conclusion that the forfeiture did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause, the district court observed that the value of Hull's property did not exceed the fine that could be imposed.
Hull contends that even if the house was “used” to commit the offenses, the rest of the acreage was not, and that only the house itself should be forfeited. The statute in Bieri I mandated forfeiture of “property” that was used “in any manner or part” to facilitate drug trafficking. It addresses, rather, how the property must be “used”-i.e., “in any manner or part”-before the “property,” as defined by the instrument that created the defendant's interest, is subject to forfeiture. We squarely rejected the contention, holding that “district courts do not have the authority to sub-divide property in order to create proportional forfeitures.” 988 F.2d at 828. Our court has said that if the value of forfeited property is within the permissible range of fines under the sentencing guidelines, then it “is presumptively not excessive,” Moyer, 313 F.3d at 1086, and, in a bolder statement, that such a forfeiture “ ‘almost certainly is not excessive.’ “ United States v. These decisions apparently proceed on the view that the sentencing guidelines “are the product of extensive research, thought, input from commentators, and experience,” and are “designed to proportion punishments to crimes with even greater precision than criminal legislation,” such that a defendant must “present a very compelling argument to persuade us to substitute our judgment for that of the United States Sentencing Commission.” 817 N. More precisely, the record showed that Hull's equity in the property was 2,632, while the maximum fine recommended by the sentencing guidelines for his offenses was 0,000.By Chris Moss It's the silver jubilee of Philip Larkin's death.